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An Opinion Without Standards: The Supreme Court’s 
Refusal to Adopt a Standard of Constitutional Review in 
District of Columbia v. Heller Will Likely Cause 
Headaches for Future Judicial Review of Gun-Control 
Regulations 
I. INTRODUCTION
“Guns don’t kill people—people kill people.”1 This is the bumper-
sticker language of many gun-rights advocates arguing that the American 
people should not have their guns snatched away simply because other 
people are killed or injured by firearms. After all, guns do not discharge 
themselves. The opposing argument, often put forth by those urging the 
government to enact stronger gun-control regulations, is seen by many to 
be equally valid: though guns do not discharge themselves, guns play a 
part—whether accidentally or purposely—in thousands of American 
deaths and injuries each year.2 These two competing interests form the 
foundation of today’s gun-control debate. 
Over the past few decades, with gun control becoming a major 
political and social issue, the debate has also focused on whether the 
Second Amendment to the Constitution grants each American citizen an 
individual right to “keep and bear Arms” or whether the Second 
Amendment establishes only a collective right to keep and bear arms in 
order to preserve a “well regulated Militia.”3 Federal courts throughout 
the country have traditionally held that the Second Amendment should 
be interpreted as giving United States citizens only a collective right to 
keep and bear arms.4 This collective-right interpretation has arguably 
made gun-control regulations easier to pass because under the collective-
right reading, the government can restrict an individual’s right to keep 
and bear arms as long as these regulations do not restrict the right to keep 
1. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO GUN CONTROL
13 (1992). 
2. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2856–57 (2008) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
4. Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
Miller was considered the seminal Second Amendment case and had traditionally been interpreted 
by courts to adopt the collective-right reading before the Supreme Court’s opinion in District of 
Columbia v. Heller. Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 
685 n.6 (2007). 
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and bear arms as related to service in a militia. The pendulum of Second 
Amendment interpretation, however, swung sharply in the opposite 
direction, in favor of an individual-right theory of the Second 
Amendment, during the 2008 Supreme Court term. 
The Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller,5 for the first 
time in its history, expressly and explicitly adopted the individual-right 
theory of the Second Amendment.6 Both Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion and Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion present persuasive and 
authoritative textual and historical arguments to support the individual- 
and collective-right theories respectively. Although the majority 
convincingly argued for an individual-right reading of the Second 
Amendment, the majority omitted from its lengthy opinion the specific 
standard of review courts should now use to determine the 
constitutionality of current and future gun-control regulations in light of 
the newly endorsed individual-right interpretation.7 Not only did the 
Court refuse to adopt a specific standard, it may have rejected, either 
explicitly or implicitly, all possible standards of constitutional review for 
gun-control regulations.8 Therefore, given the Court’s failure to adopt a 
specific standard of constitutional review for this newly adopted 
individual-right interpretation, federal courts will likely experience 
difficulties in applying the Heller opinion to existing and future gun-
control regulations. 
Part II of this Note will examine the traditional collective-right 
reading of the Second Amendment through a recent Ninth Circuit case, 
Silveira v. Lockyer.9 The Silveira opinion endorsed the collective-right 
reading and criticizes the Fifth Circuit’s adoption of the individual-right 
5. 128 S. Ct. at 2783. 
6. Id. at 2797. Although considered monumental in that it officially adopted for the first 
time an individual-right theory of the Second Amendment, this ruling by the Supreme Court was not 
unexpected. See Saul Cornell, Historical Approach: The Ironic Second Amendment, 1 ALB. GOV’T
L. REV. 292, 294 (2008) (“[T]he ultimate irony may well be that the Supreme Court [in District of 
Columbia v. Heller] could easily interpret the Second Amendment as an individual right and still 
uphold the District of Columbia’s hand gun ban as a reasonable regulation.”); Winkler, supra note 4,
at 684–86 (discussing that the Fifth Circuit adopted the individual-right theory in United States v. 
Emerson and that the individual-right theory became the official position of the Bush 
Administration’s Department of Justice in 2002). 
 7.  The standard by which gun-control regulations should be reviewed by courts under the 
individual-right theory of the Second Amendment is considered by some scholars to be nearly as 
important as the collective right vs. individual right argument itself. See Winkler, supra note 4, at 
683–86. As will be discussed in detail below, Justice Breyer in his dissent in District of Columbia v.
Heller criticized the majority for not adopting a specific standard of review and expressed the 
importance of an adoption of a standard of review under an individual-right interpretation. 128 S. Ct. 
at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“What kind of constitutional standard should the court use? How 
high a protective hurdle does the Amendment erect? The question matters.”).
8. See infra discussion and notes accompanying Part IV.D. 
9. 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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reading in United States v. Emerson10 (this opinion by the Fifth Circuit 
being the first time a federal court of appeals adopted the individual-right 
reading of the Second Amendment). Part III will summarize Justice 
Scalia and the majority’s most notable arguments for an individual-right 
reading in the Heller opinion, along with a brief treatment of both the 
dissenting opinions filed by Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer. Finally, 
Part IV of this Note will outline four alternative standards of review that 
courts might use (and that the Supreme Court could have adopted) in 
analyzing gun-control regulation under an individual-right reading of the 
Second Amendment: (1) rational-basis scrutiny, (2) strict scrutiny, (3) an 
“interest-balancing” standard as suggested by Justice Breyer’s dissent in 
Heller, and (4) intermediate scrutiny (arguably being the only standard 
not explicitly or implicitly rejected by the majority in Heller). This Note 
will endorse and argue for Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach 
as the standard that should have been adopted by the majority in Heller.
Part IV will also attempt to determine how courts are to review existing 
and future gun-control regulations given that the Court in Heller refused 
to adopt a standard and rejected most, if not all of the standards of 
constitutional review commonly used. 
II. CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
In officially endorsing an individual-right view of the Second 
Amendment, the Supreme Court in Heller seemed to settle a long and 
drawn-out legal debate that has lasted for decades. However, as one door 
of debate and controversy closed, another opened. By failing to adopt a 
standard by which gun-control regulations will be reviewed for 
constitutionality under the newly endorsed individual-right reading, the 
Court opened the door for another debate concerning this historically and 
textually ambiguous Second Amendment. 
First, it is important to establish the context surrounding the issue 
decided by the Heller opinion. On one side (the losing position in Heller)
is the theory that the Second Amendment protects a “collective right” to 
keep and bear arms.11 On the other side is the theory adopted by Justice 
Scalia in Heller: the “individual-right” theory.12 Each side has strong and 
convincing historical evidence to support its respective interpretation of 
the Second Amendment. As recently as 2001 and 2002, two federal 
appellate courts kept this dichotomy alive. In 2002, the Ninth Circuit in 
10. 270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001). 
11. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
12. Id. at 2799 (Scalia, J., majority). 
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Silveira v. Lockyer13 held in favor of a collective-right reading of the 
Second Amendment, while in 2001, the Fifth Circuit became the first 
federal appellate court to explicitly adopt an individual-right reading of 
the Second Amendment in United States v. Emerson.14 Outlined below is 
an in-depth look at the Silveira case. The Silveira court directly 
addressed several arguments set out in Emerson;15 therefore, along with 
its endorsement of the collective-right reading, the treatment of the 
Silveira case below will also introduce several of the arguments made for 
an individual-right reading by the Fifth Circuit in Emerson. The direct 
treatment of Silveira and the indirect treatment of Emerson below will 
give important context to the majority’s decision in Heller. 
A. The Collective-Right Theory: Silveira v. Lockyer 
The Ninth Circuit case Silveira v. Lockyer illustrates the long-held 
collective-right reading of the Second Amendment—the reading rejected 
by the Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller.16 In 1999, 
California amended its gun-control laws to bolster the state’s restriction 
on the “possession, use and transfer” of semi-automatic weapons or 
“assault weapons.”17 The plaintiffs in Silveira consisted of California 
residents who owned or sought to acquire assault weapons but were 
prevented from doing so because of the newly amended gun-control 
statute.18 The gun owners challenged the statute, claiming that as 
amended, the statute violated their Second Amendment right to keep and 
bear arms.19 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, endorsing a collective-right 
reading of the Second Amendment and holding that the statute did not 
violate this collective-right reading.20
1.  The Ninth Circuit first outlined the modern Second Amendment debate 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis in Silveira by outlining the 
“robust constitutional debate” that was taking place throughout the 
country concerning the proper interpretation of the Second
13. 312 F.3d at 1056. 
14. 270 F.3d at 210. 
15. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1064–65. 
16. Id. at 1061. 
17. Id. at 1056. 
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 1087. 
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Amendment.21 The court outlined three principal schools of thought at 
the heart of the debate.22 First, the court referred to the view urged by the 
National Rifle Association (“NRA”) and other pro-gun advocates as the 
“‘traditional individual right’” model.23 Those that espouse this view 
argue that individuals have a “fundamental right” to possess and use 
guns with only the most limited governmental regulation.24 The second 
view, labeled the “‘limited individual right’” model, allows individuals 
to possess and use firearms as long as the possession bears a reasonable 
relationship to military service.25
The third view, described by the Ninth Circuit as the view “widely 
accepted by the federal courts,” is the collective-right interpretation of 
the Second Amendment.26 The Ninth Circuit cited two Supreme Court 
cases that have long been used to support a collective-right reading of the 
Second Amendment.27 In the first of these cases cited by the Silveira
court, Lewis v. United States,28 the Supreme Court cited to its best-
known Second Amendment case to support a collective-right reading of 
the Second Amendment—United States v. Miller.29 The Lewis Court 
held: “The Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a 
firearm that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the 
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.’”30 The Ninth 
Circuit did not end its argument in support of a collective-right theory 
with these strong precedential Supreme Court cases. Instead, the court 
went on to conduct its own independent historical analysis to reinforce 
the collective-right reading of the Second Amendment.31
21. Id. at 1060. The court attributed this national interest in the Second Amendment to “gun 
violence, the passage of legislation restricting the sale and use of firearms, the cultural significance 
of firearms in American society, and the political activities of pro-gun enthusiasts under the 
leadership of the National Rifle Association (the NRA).” Id. 
22. Id.
23. Only one court had advocated this view of the Second Amendment before the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Heller; the Fifth Circuit adopted this view in United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 
203, 219 (5th Cir. 2001). 
24. Emerson, 270 F.3d at 219. 
25. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1060. This view is nuanced and has also been labeled the 
“sophisticated collective-right model” by the Emerson court. 270 F.3d at 219. For a discussion of 
this nuanced middle ground of the Second Amendment debate, see Silveira, 312 F.3d at n.8. 
26. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1060. 
27. Id. at 1061. 
28. 445 U.S. 55 (1980). 
29. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
30. Lewis, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178).
31. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1068–76. 
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2. The Ninth Circuit’s historical arguments in support of the collective-
right interpretation. 
The Ninth Circuit in Silveira argued for the collective-right reading 
of the Second Amendment by examining the historical significance of 
both the first (prefatory) and second (operative) clauses of the 
amendment.32 The prefatory clause reads, “A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State,” and the operative clause 
of the Second Amendment reads, “the right of the people to keep and 
bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”33 The Silveira court argued that the 
“prefatory clause of the Second Amendment sets forth the amendment’s 
purpose and intent.”34
a. The prefatory clause: the Silveira court’s interpretation of 
“militia.” The most notable argument by the Ninth Circuit concerning 
the prefatory clause deals with the meaning of the term “militia” as seen 
in Second Amendment. The court argued that the word “militia” refers to 
a state military entity. In making this argument, the Ninth Circuit was 
countering the Fifth Circuit’s argument in Emerson that the term 
“militia,” as used at the time the Second Amendment was ratified, 
referred to all citizens.35 The Silveira court argued that the use of the 
term “militia” as used in Articles I and II of the Constitution, as well as 
the Fifth Amendment, contradicts the Fifth Circuit’s very broad 
interpretation of the term militia.36 The Ninth Circuit pointed out that 
Article I grants to Congress the power to “provide for calling forth the 
Militia to execute Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel 
Invasions.”37 The court stated that “[t]he fact that the militias may be 
‘called forth’ by the federal government only in appropriate 
circumstances underscores their status as state institutions.”38 Also, the 
Commander-in-Chief Clause of Article II provides for the President to 
act as the “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States, and of the Militia of the several States.”39 The Fifth Amendment, 
which was enacted at the same time as the Second Amendment, grants 
32. This approach of analyzing the historical significance of both the prefatory and operative 
clauses and their relationship to one another is the same approach taken by the Fifth Circuit in 
Emerson and the Supreme Court in Heller—but with obviously different results. See infra Part III. 
33. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
34. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1068–69. 
35. See Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1069 (quoting United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 235 (5th 
Cir. 2001)). 
36. Id. at 1070–71. 
37. Id. at 1070 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15). 
38. Id.
39. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
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criminal defendants a right to indictment “except in cases arising in the 
land or naval forces, or in the Militia . . . .”40
According to the Silveira court, these excerpts from Article II and 
the Fifth Amendment clearly demonstrate that the Framers saw the 
“Militia” as a military body, not as the entire arms-bearing American 
population as the Fifth Circuit argued.41 Therefore, in Silveira, the Ninth 
Circuit argued that the prefatory clause of the Second Amendment 
establishes the purpose of the amendment: to provide for and preserve a 
well-regulated (state-run) militia.42
b.  The operative clause: the meaning of “keep and bear Arms.” The 
Ninth Circuit went on to analyze the operative or second clause of the 
Second Amendment.43 The court first found it “highly significant” that 
“the second clause does not purport to protect the right to ‘possess’ or 
‘own’ arms, but rather to ‘keep and bear’ arms.”44 The court argued that 
“[h]istorical research shows that the term ‘bear arms’ generally referred 
to the carrying of arms in military service—not the private use of arms 
for personal purposes.”45 The court quoted Professor Michael Dorf who, 
after “canvassing” founding-era documents, concluded that the phrase to 
“keep and bear Arms” had an overwhelmingly military connotation.46
The Ninth Circuit also cited an 1840 Tennessee Supreme Court case that 
clearly construed the term “to bear arms” to have a strictly military 
connotation.47 The Silveira court made several other historical arguments 
relating to the term “bear arms” and then moved on to address the use of 
the term “keep” in the prefatory clause.48
The Ninth Circuit focused on the term “keep” because the Emerson
court put forth the argument that the term “keep” did not have a military 
40. See Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1070–71 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V). 
41. Id. at 1071. 
42. Id. at 1071–72. 
43. Id. at 1072. 
44. Id.
45. Id. In footnote 28 of its opinion, the Silveira court pointed out that the Emerson court, in 
its argument for an individual-right reading, had focused on a few phrases where “bear arms” did not 
denote service in the military. The Emerson court focused its argument on the Report of the Minority 
of the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention of the United States Constitution. 270 F.3d 203, 230–31
(5th Cir. 2001). This Minority Report argued for a private right to bear arms, but the Silveira court 
correctly stated that this was indeed the “minority” opinion of the Pennsylvania Convention, 
meaning that this private-right-to-bear-arms argument was rejected by the Pennsylvania Convention. 
Silveira, 312 F.3d at n.28. 
46. Id. at 1072–73 (quoting Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean 
Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 291, 314 (2000)). 
47. Id. (quoting Aymette v. State, 21 Tenn. 154 (1840)) (“‘A man in pursuit of deer, elk and 
buffaloes might carry his rifle every day for forty years, and yet it would never be said of him that he 
had borne arms.’”).
48. Id. at 1072–74. 
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connotation.49 The Silveira court did not find this argument very 
convincing given that individuals may “keep” arms for many purposes, 
including military use.50 The court argued that the term “keep” has no 
meaning without knowing the purpose for which the individual is 
“keeping” the arms.51 For this reason, many scholars have construed the 
term “keep and bear” together because the term “bear” (which, according 
to the Silveira court, had a military connotation at the time of 
ratification) gives purpose to the term “keep.”52
c.  The Silveira court’s holding. The court concluded from its 
examination of both the prefatory and the operative clauses of the 
Second Amendment that “the most plausible construction of the Second 
Amendment is that it seeks to ensure the existence of effective state 
militias in which the people may exercise their right to bear arms.”53 The 
court therefore endorsed the collective-right reading of the Second 
Amendment and rejected the Emerson court’s individual-right 
interpretation. After adopting a collective-right reading, the court 
accordingly refused to strike down California’s ban on assault weapons, 
much to the dismay of gun-rights advocates such as the NRA. However, 
only six years later, the NRA and gun advocates throughout the country 
would receive their much-desired outcome in the Supreme Court of the 
United States. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S OPINION: DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA V. HELLER
In the recent landmark decision of District of Columbia v. Heller,54
the Supreme Court, for the first time in its history, interpreted the Second 
Amendment as granting an individual right to each American citizen to 
keep and bear arms.55 The District of Columbia’s gun-control regulations 
at issue in Heller essentially banned the possession of all handguns in the 
District and required those who kept other firearms at home to either 
disassemble their guns or render them unusable by employing a trigger-
49. See id. at 1074. 
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. Construing the term “keep and bear” together is tersely rejected by Justice Scalia in 
his majority opinion in Heller. See infra Part.III.A.1.b. Both sides offer very convincing arguments 
as to the meaning of and correct reading of the term “keep and bear Arms.” These dueling historical 
arguments, although interesting, are never-ending. The fact that the individual-right theory wins the 
day in Heller appears to be the result of a majority of Justices espousing one of the two arguments—
not because of the historical strength of the individual-right reading and the historical weakness of 
the collective-right reading. 
53. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1075.
54. 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
55. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797.
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locking mechanism.56 Mr. Dick Heller challenged the constitutionality of 
the D.C. handgun regulations.57 Mr. Heller was allowed to carry a 
handgun while he worked as a special police officer at the Federal 
Judicial Center, but under the anti-handgun regulation, Mr. Heller was 
not allowed to register a handgun that he wished to keep at his home.58
Mr. Heller argued that this ban on handguns and the regulation’s 
requirement to render all other firearms kept in the home unusable were 
violations of his right to have access to a weapon for self-defense in the 
home.59 The U.S. District Court dismissed Mr. Heller’s challenge of the 
D.C. gun-control regulations,60 but the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit reversed, finding the regulations unconstitutional.61
With this decision, the D.C. Circuit became the second federal 
appellate court (the Fifth Circuit in Emerson being the first) to hold that 
the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear 
arms.62 The court held that “the city’s total ban on handguns, as well as 
its requirement that firearms in the home be kept nonfunctional even 
when necessary for self-defense” violated Mr. Heller’s individual right to 
keep and bear arms.63 As discussed above, the Supreme Court fully 
affirmed the D.C. Circuit’s holding the following year.64 The Ninth 
Circuit in Silveira outlined the strongest arguments in support of a 
collective-right reading of the Second Amendment.65 Outlined below are 
the strongest arguments in support of an individual-right reading of the 
Second Amendment as espoused by Justice Scalia and the majority in 
Heller. 
A. The Supreme Court Discusses the “Meaning”of the Second 
Amendment 
In his majority opinion in Heller, Justice Scalia devoted twenty-
seven pages of his thirty-five-page opinion to argue that the Second 
Amendment’s proper meaning grants each individual citizen a right to 
56. See D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(12); 7-2502.01(a); 7-2502.02(a)(4); 7.2507.02 (2001) 
(providing that individuals could possess handguns with a one-year license from the District; 
however, the District gave licenses only in a very narrow set of circumstances). 
57. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788. 
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2004). 
61. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
62. Id.
63. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788. 
64. Id. at 2822. 
65. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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keep and bear arms for the purpose of self-defense.66 This “Meaning of 
the Second Amendment” section focuses primarily on the historical and 
textual arguments in favor of an individual-right reading of the Second 
Amendment. Justice Scalia also, to a lesser degree, discussed whether an 
individual-right reading conflicts with any Supreme Court precedent 
cases67 and whether the right to keep and bear arms exists through 
natural law, separate from any enumeration of this right.68
1. Justice Scalia’s historical and textual support for an individual-right 
reading 
Like the Fifth Circuit in Emerson,69 Justice Scalia analyzed the 
historical and textual meanings of the prefatory and operative clauses of 
the Second Amendment to argue for an individual-right reading.70 Justice 
Scalia first disputed the argument made in Silveira and by Justice 
Stevens in his dissent that the prefatory clause limits the operative 
clause.71 Justice Scalia refuted this argument by quoting a nineteenth-
century commentary on written laws, which states: “‘It is nothing 
unusual in acts . . . for the enacting part to go beyond the preamble; the 
remedy often extends beyond the particular act or mischief which first 
suggested the necessity of the law.’”72 This is an important piece of the 
majority’s argument for an individual-right reading of the Second 
Amendment because the collective-right advocates argue that the 
prefatory clause gives meaning or purpose to the operative clause and 
thereby limits its meaning.73 Instead of beginning with an analysis of the 
prefatory clause, however, Justice Scalia began by analyzing the 
operative clause.74
66. Id. at 2789–2816. 
67. Id. at 2812–15. 
68. Id. at 2801. 
69. See supra Part II.A.2. 
70. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789. Justice Scalia also refers to the prefatory clause as the 
“preamblee” and the operative clause as the “enacting part.”
71. Id. at 2789. 
72. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2789 (quoting J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON WRITTEN LAWS AND 
THEIR INTERPRETATION §51, at 49 (1882)). 
73. See Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2002). 
74. Justice Scalia began with the operative clause because he claims that the prefatory clause 
can only be used to “clarify an ambiguous operative provision” and that, therefore, “surely the first 
step must be to determine whether the operative clause provision is ambiguous.” Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 
2790 n.4. This approach of analyzing the operative clause before the prefatory clause is criticized by 
Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion. See id. at 2826 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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a.  The majority’s analysis of the term “Right of the People” in the 
operative clause. Justice Scalia and the majority began their analysis of 
the operative clause of the Second Amendment by examining the term 
“Right of the People.”75 The Court points out that this term is used two 
other times in the Bill of Rights: in the First Amendment’s Assembly-
and-Petition Clause and in the Fourth Amendment’s Search-and-Seizure 
Clause.76 According to the Court, the term “Right of the People” in the 
First and Fourth Amendments “unambiguously refer[s] to individual 
rights, not ‘collective’ rights, or rights that may be exercised only 
through participation in some corporate body.”77 Given that the use of 
“Right of the People” elsewhere in the Bill of Rights denotes individual 
rights, the Court sees this as an implication that the use of “Right of the 
People” in the Second Amendment should also have an individual-right 
connotation.78 Justice Scalia also examined when the term “the people” is 
used elsewhere in the Constitution.79 According to the majority, the six 
other times “the people” appears in the Constitution, the term 
“unambiguously refers to all member of the political community, not an 
unspecified subset.”80
b.  The majority’s analysis of “keep and bear Arms” in the operative 
clause. Justice Scalia and the majority next addressed the phrase “keep 
and bear Arms” as seen in the operative clause of the Second 
Amendment.81 The Court argued that the term “arms” applied to 
weapons that were not specifically designed for military use.82 The Court 
cited Cunningham’s legal dictionary as saying: “‘Servants and labourers 
shall use bows and arrows on Sundays & c. and not bear other arms.’”83
Justice Scalia explained that the term “‘bear’” in the eighteenth century 
meant “‘carry.’”84 Justice Scalia wisely cited to Justice Ginsburg’s 




79. Id. at 2790–91. 
80. Id. (citing TIMOTHY CUNNINGHAM, 1 A NEW AND COMPLETE LAW DICTIONARY (1771)). 
Justice Scalia cited here to United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, which states, “‘The people’ seems to 
have been a term of art employed in select parts of the Constitution . . . [that] refers to a class of 
persons who are part of a national community.” 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
81. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791. 
82. Id.
83. Id. This use of the word “arms” clearly does not limit its use to military situations, since 
it is used in the context of service or labor. But see J. TRUSLER, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WORDS 
ESTEEMED SYNONYMOUS IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 37 (1794) (“[T]his eighteenth-century 
thesaurus limited “arms” to have the meaning of “instruments of offence generally made use of in 
war.”).
84. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2793 (citing T. SHERIDAN, A COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1796)). 
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opinion in Muscarello v. United States,85 in which she reasoned that the 
term “carry a firearm” had the meaning “as the Constitution’s Second 
Amendment . . . indicate[s]: ‘wear, bear , or carry . . . for the purpose . . .
of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of 
conflict with another person.’”86 Justice Scalia agreed with Justice 
Ginsburg’s definition of “bear arms” and pointed out that Justice 
Ginsburg’s definition “in no way connotes participation in a structured 
military organization.”87 The majority concluded that this definition of 
“bear arms” enunciated by Justice Ginsburg was the “natural meaning” 
of “bear arms” in the eighteenth century.88
The Court went on to buttress its position by arguing that the most 
notable evidence of the eighteenth-century meaning of “bear arms” is 
found in nine state constitutions drafted in the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries.89 These state constitutions grant each citizen the 
right to “‘bear arms in defense of himself and the state.’”90 The Court 
argued that this formulation of “bear arms” in the state constitutions did 
not exclusively refer to bearing arms in a military capacity; on the 
contrary, this formulation explicitly reserved to each citizen an individual 
right to bear arms for the purpose of his self-defense.91
The majority also addressed a study discussed by Justice Stevens in 
his dissent, which concluded that the term “bear arms” was most 
frequently used in a military context at the time of the ratification.92
Justice Scalia rejected this argument by reasoning that the fact that the 
term “bear arms” was frequently used in one context does not necessarily 
limit its use to that frequently used context.93 Justice Scalia also 
addressed Justice Stevens’s argument (also made by the Ninth Circuit in 
Silveira94) that “‘keep and bear Arms’” is a unitary phrase—or, in other 
words, that the term “bear” gives meaning to the term “keep.”95 Justice 
85. Id. (citing Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998)). 
86. Id. (quoting Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 
87. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2793. This is well argued by Justice Scalia, given that he uses Justice 
Ginsburg’s definition of “bear arms”—Justice Ginsburg being one of the four dissenting Justices in 
the Heller case. Id. at 2787. 
88. Id. at 2793. 
89. Id.
90. Id. (citing PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XIII; VT. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § XV; 
KY. CONST. art. XII, cl. 23 (1792); OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 20 (1802); IND. CONST. art. I, § 20 
(1816); MISS. CONST. art. I, § 23 (1817); CONN. CONST. art. I, § 17 (1818); ALA. CONST. art. I § 23 
(1819); MO. CONST. art. XIII, § 3 (1820)). 
91. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2793. 
92. Id. at 2795; see id. at 2828–29 n.9 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
93. Id. at 2795. 
94. See supra Part II.A.2. 
95. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797. 
259] An Opinion Without Standards: District of Columbia v. Heller 271 
Scalia disagreed that “‘keep and bear Arms’” is a unitary phrase, but he 
stated that even assuming the phrase was unitary, there is no evidence 
that this phrase has a military meaning.96 Instead, Justice Scalia cited to 
historical instances where “keep and bear Arms” has a nonmilitary 
meaning.97 The majority concluded its analysis of the operative clause by 
stating: “Putting all of these textual elements together, we find that they 
guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of 
confrontation.”98
c.  The majority’s analysis of “well regulated Militia” in the 
prefatory clause. After its extensive analysis of the operative clause, the 
majority next briefly turned to the prefatory clause in order to criticize 
the petitioners’ and the dissenting Justices’ “narrow” view of the 
definition of the term “Militia” as found in the Second Amendment.99
The petitioners (the District of Columbia) argued that “militias” during 
the time period of ratification were state or congressionally regulated 
military forces.100 Justice Scalia, however, explained that “‘the Militia 
comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the 
common defense.’”101 Justice Scalia argued that militias were groups of 
citizens able to fight, not existing, organized bodies ready to fight.102
This point is important to the majority because if militia denoted all able-
bodied male citizens, all able male citizens would have the right to keep 
and bear arms—whether a militia was organized or not. Justice Scalia’s 
definition of “militia” undercuts one of the main arguments used by 
those who endorse a collective-right reading of the Second 
Amendment.103 The majority only briefly examined the term “‘well 
96. Id. This claim that there is no evidence that the unitary phrase “keep and bear Arms” has 
a military meaning is directly rebutted by the Ninth Circuit in Silveira v. Lockyer. See supra Part 
II.A.2. The Ninth Circuit argued that “bear” has a military meaning and that when “bear” is read 
with “keep,” the unitary phrase has a military meaning. Id. This argument between individual-right 
advocates and collective-right advocates is a perfect example of the directly conflicting, yet equally 
reputable, historical evidence that each side uses to support its respective position in the debate. This 
argument also suggests that perhaps the individual-right reading won out not because it is the correct 
argument (it may be impossible to tell which one is correct), but because the majority simply chose 
to accept one group of valid historical arguments over another group of valid historical arguments. 
97. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797 (“In a 1780 debate in the House of Lords, for example, Lord 
Richmond described an order to disarm private citizens (not militia members) as a ‘violation of the 
constitutional right of Protestant subjects to keep and bear arms for their own defense.’” 49 THE
LONDON MAGAZINE OR GENTLEMEN’S MONTHLY INTELLIGENCER 467 (1780)). 
98. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797. 
99. Id. at 2799. 
100. Id. (citing Brief for Petitioners, at 12). 
 101. Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). 
102. Id.
 103. See Part II.A.2.a. 
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regulated’” in the prefatory clause as meaning “the imposition of proper 
discipline and training.”104
One reason for the majority’s relatively brief treatment of the 
prefatory clause is, according to Justice Scalia, the prefatory clause does 
not limit the operative clause.105 Therefore, since the “right of the people 
to keep and bear Arms” language in the operative clause is most 
important to the majority, Justice Scalia focused on this right-granting 
language. Justice Scalia went on to ask: “Does the preface [prefatory 
clause] fit with an operative clause that creates an individual right to 
keep and bear arms?”106 He answered his own question by saying: “It fits 
perfectly, once one knows the history that the founding generation knew 
and that we have described above.”107
d.  The majority’s alternative, natural-right argument for the Second 
Amendment. An element of the majority’s opinion worth exploring here 
is Justice Scalia’s acknowledgment that it is “entirely sensible that the 
Second Amendment’s prefatory clause announces the purpose for which 
the right was codified: to prevent elimination of the militia.”108 However, 
as discussed above, according to Justice Scalia, the prefatory clause does 
not suggest that the right to bear arms should be limited to the militia—
Justice Scalia claimed that Americans expected and today expect more 
from the Second Amendment.109
One might argue that even though protecting the militia is not the 
only expectation Americans have of the Second Amendment—the text of 
the Amendment itself does not suggest that it meant more. Justice Scalia 
appeared to address this problem by arguing that the right to bear arms 
was and is “ancient” or natural.110 Justice Scalia argued that the Framers, 
through the Second Amendment, codified a right that already existed. 
The Second Amendment declared or formalized this ancient right, but 
the right existed before the ratification of this Amendment and, 
according to Justice Scalia, the individual right to keep and bear arms 
continued to exist after the ratification—regardless of what was meant by 
 104. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2800 (citing SAMUEL JOHNSON, 1 DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 1619 (4th ed. 1773)). 
105. Id. at 2789. 
106. Id. at 2801. 
 107. Id. With the phrase, “[i]t fits perfectly,” Justice Scalia may be overplaying his hand. The 
majority makes a strong argument for an individual-right reading of the Second Amendment, but 
saying that “[i]t fits perfectly” is probably the strongest statement Justice Scalia could make, 
especially considering that these two clauses have been debated for decades. If it is so clear that the 
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the Second Amendment.111 Justice Scalia did not rely on this “natural 
right to bear arms” idea as the crux of his argument, but if he did, this 
argument would be rather convincing. With this natural-right argument, 
Justice Scalia could essentially concede to the dissenters all of their 
historical and textual arguments surrounding the Second Amendment and 
still come out victorious—the natural right to keep and bear arms would 
exist independent of any text.
e.  The interpretation of the Second Amendment immediately after its 
ratification. To solidify its argument that the Second Amendment 
granted an individual right to keep and bear arms, the majority examines 
post-ratification commentary on the meaning of the Second 
Amendment.112 According to Justice Scalia, three “important founding-
era legal scholars” interpreted the Second Amendment as protecting an 
individual right “unconnected with military service.”113 First, Justice 
Scalia cited to what is arguably the most well-known and notable legal 
commentary: Blackstone.114 According to Justice Scalia, “St. George 
Tucker’s version of Blackstone’s Commentaries . . . conceived of the 
Blackstonian arms right as necessary for self-defense.”115 The majority 
also quotes Tucker as saying: “The right to self-defense is the first law of 
nature. . . .”116
Second, Justice Scalia discussed the Second Amendment views of 
William Rawle, who was a prominent lawyer and a member of the 
Pennsylvania Ratification Assembly.117 In 1825, while writing 
concerning the meaning of the Second Amendment, Rawle stated: “No 
clause in the constitution could by any rule of construction be conceived 
to give to congress a power to disarm the people.”118 Third, the majority 
cited to Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
111. Id. This brief foray by Justice Scalia into the natural or declaratory world appears to be an 
argument in the alternative from his long, drawn-out historical and textual arguments discussed 
above. If Justice Scalia’s historical arguments are valid, he does not need this natural-right argument 
(it should be noted that Justice Scalia does not use the term “natural right,” but he certainly implies 
that this “ancient” right existed before the ratification of the Second Amendment and that the 
Amendment merely codified this right). A natural-right argument does, however, have some teeth. If 
the Second Amendment only declared or formalized a natural, fundamental right, (the right to keep 
and bear arms), then the proper meaning or context of the Second Amendment would not make any 
difference because under a natural-right theory, the right to keep and bear arms exists independent of 
the Second Amendment—whether individual, collective or otherwise. 




116. Id. (quoting 1 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, at App. 300). 
117. Id. at 2805–06. 
118. Id. (quoting RAWLE 121–22). 
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States, which was published in 1833.119 Justice Scalia likely addressed 
Story’s commentaries because Justice Stevens’s dissent claimed that 
“[t]here is not so much as a whisper”120 in Story’s commentaries that 
favors an individual-right reading of the Second Amendment.121 Justice 
Scalia stated that Justice Stevens “is wrong” about Story’s 
commentaries.122 Justice Scalia argued that Story cited to both Tucker 
and Rawle for his analysis of the Second Amendment—both of whom 
explicitly adopted an individual right to bear arms.123 The majority also 
cited to an 1840 work by Story in which he wrote that one way in which 
tyrants “‘accomplish their purposes without resistance, is, by disarming 
the people, and making it an offence to keep arms.’”124 This post-
ratification commentary strongly supports Justice Scalia’s argument for 
an individual-right reading of the Second Amendment. 
2. Justice Scalia addresses whether Supreme Court precedent allows an 
individual-right reading 
Justice Scalia and the majority relatively briefly addressed whether 
an individual-right reading of the Second Amendment is at odds with 
past Supreme Court precedent.125 Justice Scalia addressed the Supreme 
Court case most relied upon by the collective-right-reading advocates—
United States v. Miller.126 The majority was forced to address Supreme 
Court precedent because Justice Stevens in his dissent stated, 
 Even if the textual and historical arguments on both sides of the 
issue were evenly balanced, respect for the well-settled views of all of 
our predecessors on this Court, and for the rule of law itself . . . would 
prevent most jurists from endorsing such a dramatic upheaval in the 
law.127
119. Id. at 2806. 
120. Id. at 2840 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
121. Id. at 2806 (Scalia, J., majority). 
122. Id.
 123. Id.
124. Id. at 2807 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, A FAMILIAR EXPOSITION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 450 (reprinted in 1986) (1840)). This quote from Story’s 1840 work may also 
be used to argue that he was not speaking of the people as individuals, but collectively in the context 
of the militia. The quote is too ambiguous to know if Story was discussing the individual rights of 
the people to keep arms for self-defense or if Story was discussing the right of the people generally 
to defend themselves from tyrants as a people—as through militias. 
125. Id. at 2812. 
  126. 307 U.S. 174 (1939). 
127. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2824 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Scalia asked, “And what is, according to Justice Stevens, the 
holding of Miller that demands such obeisance?”128 Justice Scalia 
promptly rejected any argument that Miller adopted a collective, militia-
related right to bear arms.129 However, the evidence Justice Scalia used 
to support his argument that the Miller case does not adopt a collective-
right theory is unclear and rather weak. Justice Scalia cited the following 
language from Miller, 
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or 
use of a [short-barreled shotgun] at this time has some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, 
we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep 
and bear such an instrument.130
Justice Scalia went on to say that this language from the Miller case “is 
not only consistent with, but positively suggests that, the Second 
Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms.”131 It is 
unclear how Justice Scalia can make this claim. Also, Justice Scalia 
stated that if the Court had believed that the Second Amendment 
protected only those serving in the militia; it would have been odd to 
examine the character of the weapon rather than note that the two men 
were not militiamen.132 However, in the language cited above, the Miller
Court is using the prefatory clause as a limit on the operative “right to 
bear Arms” clause: an idea staunchly rejected by the majority earlier in 
Justice Scalia’s opinion.133 In the majority’s rather strong endorsement 
for the individual-right reading of the Second Amendment, this 
discussion of the Miller holding may be the weakest part of the opinion. 
Therefore, through historical, textual, natural law, and doctrinal 
arguments, Justice Scalia and the majority endorsed the individual-right 
reading of the Second Amendment for the first time in Supreme Court 
history. 
128. Id. at 2814 (Scalia, J., majority). 
129. Id.
 130. Id. (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at 178) (emphasis added). 
 131. Id.
132. Id. at 2814. 
133. See discussion supra Part III.A.1.c. 
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B. Justice Stevens’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens’s dissent is very similar to the Ninth Circuit’s 
arguments set forth in the Silveira case outlined above.134 The Stevens 
dissent cited to historical, textual, and doctrinal arguments to support a 
collective-right reading of the Second Amendment.135 Most notably, 
Justice Stevens argued that the militia-related prefatory clause limits the 
right-bearing operative clause and that the intent of the Framers was not 
to grant an individual right to bear arms, but to grant a collective, 
military-related right to bear arms.136 Justice Stevens also cited to the 
Supreme Court precedent case of United States v. Miller to argue for a 
collective-right reading of the Second Amendment.137 These main 
arguments in Justice Stevens’s dissent have been extensively examined 
above in this Note’s treatment of both the Silveira case and the 
majority’s opinion above. Since these arguments have already been 
treated above, they will not be repeated here. 
C.  Justice Breyer’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Breyer joined with Justice Stevens’s dissent in the Heller
opinion but added his own, independent dissenting opinion to further 
counter the majority’s historical and textual arguments. Justice Breyer 
also added some important discussion regarding deference to legislative 
findings relating to gun death and injury statistics.138 Finally, Justice 
Breyer’s dissent exposed the majority’s failure to adopt a standard for 
courts to review existing and future gun-control regulations under this 
newly accepted individual-right reading of the Second Amendment.139
Since the historical and textual arguments countering the individual-right 
reading were extensively treated above in the Silveira opinion,140 and 
since the standard-of-review discussion will be treated extensively
below, this section will examine Justice Breyer’s argument for deference 
to gun-related death and injury statistics to support his arguments against 
the majority. 
As has been outlined above, the two competing interests in the gun-
control debate are (1) the government’s interest in the public safety of its 
 134. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
  135. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2822–47 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
136. Id. at 2827–33. 
137. Id. at 2845–46. 
138. Id. at 2854–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
139. Id. at 2851–53. 
140. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
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citizens, and (2) the protection of each citizen’s enumerated rights.141 In 
striking down the D.C. gun-control regulations, the majority generally 
chose to “protect” each citizen’s enumerated right to keep and bear arms 
over the government’s public safety interest. In his dissent, Justice 
Breyer used legislative findings and statistics to argue that the Court 
should have deferred to the D.C. legislature and aligned itself with the                 
government’s (in this case, the District of Columbia’s) “compelling” 
interest in public safety.142
Justice Breyer first asked the reader to “consider the facts as the 
legislature saw them when it adopted the District [gun-control] statute” 
in 1976.143 The goal of the statute, according to the local council 
committee, was “to reduce the potentiality for gun-related crimes and 
gun-related deaths from occurring within the District of Columbia.”144
The committee conducted “extensive public hearings and lengthy 
research” to come to its conclusion that “the easy availability of 
firearms” has greatly contributed to the increase “in gun-related violence 
and crime over the past 40 years.”145 The Council consulted various mid-
1970 gun-control statistics, for example, that guns were at least in part 
responsible for 69 deaths in the United States every day, 25,000 such 
deaths each year.146 The Council also had information that in the 1970s, 
guns were responsible for 200,000 serious injuries in the United States.147
In the District of Columbia itself, 285 murders were perpetrated by guns 
in 1974—”a record number.”148 The Council also had information that 
twenty-five percent of murders occurred among families and that 
“firearms are more frequently involved in deaths and violence among 
relatives and friends than in premeditated activities.”149 In passing the 
gun-control regulations at issue in Heller, the Council especially focused 
on the control of handguns because “the committee report found them to 
have a particularly strong link to undesirable activities in the District’s 
exclusively urban environment.”150 Therefore, according to Justice 
Breyer, the District of Columbia City Council had ample justification in 
passing such a gun-control regulation in the 1970s. 
141. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
142. Id. at 2854–57, 2861. 
143. Id. at 2854. 
 144. Id. (quoting Hearing and Disposition before the House Committee on the District of 
Columbia on H. Con. Res. 694, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 25 (1976)). 
145. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 2855. 
149. Id.
150. Id.
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Justice Breyer next suggested that the reader also “consider the facts 
as a court must consider them looking at the matter as of today.”151 In 
other words, does the statute still have statistical support today? 
According to Justice Breyer, the answer is a resounding “yes.”152 Justice 
Breyer cited various statistics that show only an increase in the severity 
of gun-related violence in both the United States and the District of 
Columbia since the statute was passed by the District of Columbia in 
1976.153 However, Justice Breyer also outlined statistics presented by 
those individuals seeking to overturn the D.C. regulations: statistics 
intended to demonstrate that the D.C. regulations have not made a 
difference in the violence.154 Justice Breyer did not attempt to make 
sense out of the dueling statistics presented, but he convincingly 
concluded that the District had very important reasons for enacting the 
gun-control regulations and that the Court should defer to those strong 
justifications: “For these reasons, I conclude that the District’s statute 
properly seeks to further the sort of life-preserving and public-safety 
interests that the Court has called ‘compelling.’”155
IV.  WHAT IS THE PROPER STANDARD OF REVIEW UNDER AN 
INDIVIDUAL-RIGHT READING? 
The preceding twenty-plus pages of this Note have been largely
dedicated to the dueling historical, textual, and doctrinal arguments put 
forth by both sides (both collectivists and individualists) of the Second 
Amendment debate. Now that the Supreme Court has apparently laid this 
debate to rest, how should courts scrutinize existing and future gun-
control regulations for constitutionality under the newly adopted 
individual-right reading of the Second Amendment? Unfortunately, the 
majority in Heller refused to answer this question and failed to adopt a 
specific standard of constitutional scrutiny.156 However, as stated by 
Justice Breyer in his dissent, “The question matters.”157 All the historical, 
151. Id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)). 
152. Id. at 2859. 
153. See id. at 2856–57. 
154. See id. at 2857–60. 
155. Id. at 2861 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987)). 
156. See id. at 2850–51. The majority rejected the rational-basis standard explicitly and the 
strict scrutiny standard implicitly (both of these standards and the majority’s reaction to them will be 
explored below), but Justice Scalia and the majority were silent as to an appropriate standard of 
review. See id. at 2816–17 (Scalia, J., majority). 
157. Id. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The majority merely states that the District of 
Columbia’s gun law is unconstitutional under “any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied 
to enumerated constitutional rights.” Id. at 2817–18 (Scalia, J., majority). The majority does respond 
to Justice Breyer’s “interest-balancing” approach with criticism (which will be examined in greater 
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textual, and doctrinal support for the individual-right reading of the 
Second Amendment is for naught if courts are given very little direction 
on how to review gun-control regulations under this newly endorsed 
interpretation. Yet, as decided, Heller provided very little direction for 
future review of gun-control regulations. Justice Breyer’s dissent rightly 
called the majority out on this issue.158 Justice Breyer reviewed three 
potential standards that the majority could have adopted: (1) the rational-
basis-scrutiny standard, (2) the strict-scrutiny standard, and (3) an 
“interest balancing” standard (this is the standard outlined and adopted 
by Justice Breyer).159 Each of these standards was analyzed and critiqued 
below with Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing standard of review being 
the standard the majority should have adopted in the Heller case. The 
only standard not rejected by the Court in Heller, the intermediate 
standard, is also briefly examined. 
A.  Evaluating Gun-Control Regulations under the Rational-Basis 
Standard 
The rational-basis standard “requires a court to uphold regulation[s] 
so long as [they] bear a ‘rational relationship’ to a ‘legitimate 
governmental purpose.’”160 Under rational-basis scrutiny, “A statute is 
presumed constitutional.”161 That is, courts are extremely deferential to 
legislatures, requiring “the one attacking the legislative arrangement to 
negative every conceivable basis which might support it.”162 Under this 
deferential rational-basis standard, “[A] legislative choice . . . may be 
based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical 
data.”163 When courts review laws under this very deferential standard, 
“almost all laws”164 will be upheld. 
The majority in Heller stated that the District of Columbia’s gun 
regulations at issue in the case were unconstitutional under any of the 
standards of scrutiny previously used by the Court to examine 
detail below), but the Court still refuses to adopt a standard of review, saying, “[S]ince this case 
represents this Court’s first in-depth examination of the Second Amendment, one should not expect 
it to clarify the entire field.” Id. at 2821. Adopting a standard of review to enable courts to correctly 
evaluate gun-control regulations would hardly require the Court to clarify “the entire field,” yet the 
majority mysteriously refuses to venture down the road of constitutional standards of review. 
158. See id. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
159. See id. at 2850–53. 
 160. Id. at 2851 (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)). 
 161. Doe, 509 U.S. at 320. 
162. Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364 (1973) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
163. FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993).
164. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.27 (Scalia, J., majority). 
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enumerated constitutional rights.165 However, as Justice Breyer pointed 
out in his dissent, the D.C. regulations would almost certainly survive 
rational-basis-scrutiny review.166 In response to Justice Breyer’s 
criticism, the majority stated that rational-basis scrutiny is predominantly 
used when the courts are evaluating laws that themselves prohibit 
“irrational” laws.167 Therefore, according to the majority, rational-basis 
scrutiny should “not be used to evaluate the extent to which a legislature 
may regulate a specific, enumerated right . . . [such as] the right to keep 
and bear arms.”168 Whether rational-basis scrutiny could apply or not, if 
this deferential standard were used to evaluate the D.C. gun-control laws 
at issue in this case, these regulations would likely be upheld because 
there would only need to be a showing of some rational basis for the 
laws. One clearly rational basis or legitimate governmental purpose for 
enacting the D.C. gun regulations was to prevent gun-related accidents. 
Additionally, under rational-basis scrutiny, the District would not even 
need to present empirical data as a foundation for this legitimate 
governmental purpose (which the legislature nevertheless did).169 In 
anticipation of the Heller case, several scholars thought the Court could, 
and even should, adopt this rational-basis-scrutiny standard in evaluating 
gun-control regulations.170
Evaluating gun-control regulations under a rational-basis-scrutiny 
standard is likely too deferential to legislatures, especially given the 
Court’s finding that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual 
right to keep and bear arms.171 If essentially every gun-control regulation 
is upheld because the regulations are being evaluated under a rational-
basis-scrutiny standard, the Supreme Court’s individual-right holding 
would be gutted; no gun-control regulation would be found to violate the 
165. Id. at 2817–18. 
166. Id. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The majority is wrong when it says that the District’s 
law is unconstitutional ‘[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated 
constitutional rights.’ How could that be? It certainly would not be unconstitutional under, for 
example, a ‘rational basis’ standard . . . .”).
167. Id. at 2817 n.27 (Scalia, J., majority). 
168. Id. (“If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear arms was a rational 
basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the separate constitutional prohibitions on 
irrational laws, and would have no effect.”).
169. Id.
170. See Saul Cornell, Historical Approach: The Ironic Second Amendment, 1 ALB. GOV’T L.
REV. 292, 294 (2008) (“[T]he ultimate irony may well be that the Supreme Court [in District of 
Columbia v. Heller] could easily interpret the Second Amendment as an individual right and still 
uphold the District of Columbia’s hand gun ban as a reasonable regulation.”); Winkler, supra note 4, 
at 686. 
 171. But see Winkler, supra note 4, at 686. Professor Winkler argues that “the Second 
Amendment’s individual right to bear arms is appropriately governed by deferential, reasonableness 
review under which nearly all gun control laws would survive judicial scrutiny.” Id.
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individual right of citizens to keep and bear arms because every 
legislature could demonstrate a rational basis for the regulation. Whether 
one agrees with the Court’s individual-right reading or not, if lower 
courts are to follow the holding in Heller, this entirely deferential 
standard would not allow courts to apply an individual-right reading to 
any gun-control regulations and would essentially invalidate the Heller
Court’s holding. Therefore, the rational-basis-scrutiny standard should 
not, and likely will not, be used by lower courts to evaluate gun-control 
regulations under the newly adopted individual-right reading of the 
Second Amendment.172
B.  Evaluating Gun-Control Regulations under a Strict-Scrutiny 
Standard 
The strict-scrutiny standard is essentially the opposite of the rational-
basis standard. That is, under the strict-scrutiny standard, instead of 
greatly deferring to legislatures, courts examine each law very closely 
“to determine whether it is ‘narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling 
governmental interest.’”173 Strict scrutiny is most commonly used when 
dealing with race-based legislation or classification.174 The Supreme 
Court has held, “all racial classifications [imposed by government] . . .
must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”175 Courts 
impose strict-scrutiny review in race-based situations because racial 
classifications “raise special fears that they are motivated by an invidious 
purpose.”176 Strict scrutiny is also employed by courts when statutes 
“interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right, such as freedom of 
speech”177 or the free exercise of religion.178 Strict scrutiny requires 
courts to perform a “searching judicial inquiry”179 into the impetus 
behind, and reasons for, the enactment of the law in question. 
Strict scrutiny is, along with rational-basis scrutiny, an inappropriate 
standard by which gun-control regulations should be evaluated.180 Unlike 
the rational-basis standard where essentially all gun-control regulations 
172. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.27. 
 173. Id. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 82 (1997)). 
174. See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505–06 (2005). 
175. Id. at 505 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) 
(alteration in original)). 
176. Id. at 505. 
 177. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983). 
178. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981). 
179. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). 
180. See Winkler, supra note 4, at 686. But see Roy Lucas, From Patsone & Miller to Silveira 
v. Lockyer: To Keep and Bear Arms, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 257, 329 (2004). 
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would be upheld, under a strict-scrutiny standard, essentially all gun-
control regulations would be overturned or struck down. Under strict 
scrutiny, even gun-control laws explicitly accepted by the majority in 
Heller, such as laws governing concealed weapons, laws governing the 
sale of firearms, and laws restricting weapons in certain locations (like 
schools) could become constitutionally jeopardized.181 Professor Adam 
Winkler states that gun laws should not be reviewed under a strict-
scrutiny standard because “gun laws are generally motivated by 
legitimate public safety concerns rather than invidious purposes.”182
Justice Breyer, in his dissent, rejected the strict-scrutiny standard for 
reviewing gun-control regulations and claimed that the majority 
implicitly did the same.183 Justice Breyer cites to a law review article that 
summarizes hundreds of gun-control decisions by the Supreme Courts of 
42 states; these courts have expansively adopted a standard that is more 
deferential to legislatures than strict scrutiny.184 Justice Breyer claimed 
the majority implicitly rejected the strict-scrutiny standard “by broadly 
approving a set of laws”; the section of the majority opinion Justice 
Breyer is referring to reads in part as follows:
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not 
unlimited. . . . [N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt 
on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons 
and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in 
sensitive places such as schools or government buildings . . . .185
The majority labels these laws that limit the right to keep and bears arms 
as “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.”186 In other words, since 
these laws limiting the right to bear arms are “presumptively lawful,” 
courts are not allowed to impose the higher strict-scrutiny standard to 
these regulations; under a strict-scrutiny standard, instead of courts 
presuming constitutionally, these laws would be considered 
presumptively unlawful. However, as described above,187 the strict-
scrutiny standard may apply to laws limiting the exercise of fundamental 
181. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817; see also id. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
182. Winkler, supra note 4, at 727. 
183. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
184. See id. at 2852 (citing Winkler, supra note 4, at 687, 716–18). Justice Breyer recognizes 
that these state cases “obviously are not controlling” but explains that these cases are instructive. Id.
(citing Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 134 (1959)); see also David B. Kopel, What State 
Constitutions Teach About the Second Amendment, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 827, 827–29 (2002). 
185. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817. 
186. Id. at 2817 n.26. 
187. See supra text accompanying note 177. 
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rights. Is the newly declared individual right to keep and bear arms 
“fundamental”? Although the majority in Heller did not specifically label 
the individual right to keep and bear arms as fundamental, the majority 
likely considers the right as such.188 It appears therefore paradoxical that 
the Court would imply that the individual right to keep and bear arms is 
fundamental and yet not grant this fundamental right strict-scrutiny 
protection as it has with free speech and the free exercise of religion.189
Why does the majority reject applying the strict-scrutiny standard to 
the Second Amendment and allow certain laws that limit the reach of the 
right to keep and bear arms to be considered “presumptively” 
constitutional or lawful? The answer is relatively clear: for the sake of 
public safety and general well being.190 But how far does this public 
safety interest extend? After all, the District of Columbia enacted the 
gun-control legislation at issue in Heller for the sake of public safety.191
The answer to the question of how far the public safety interest should 
extend may be found in Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing approach to 
evaluating the constitutionality of gun-control regulations outlined 
below. 
C. Evaluating Gun-Control Regulations under Justice Breyer’s Interest-
Balancing Approach 
Instead of adopting the rational-basis or strict-scrutiny standards, 
Justice Breyer adopted “an interest-balancing inquiry” for the 
constitutional evaluation of gun-control regulations under the individual-
right theory of the Second Amendment.192 Justice Breyer’s interest-
balancing inquiry would weigh “the interests protected by the Second 
Amendment on one side and the governmental public-safety concerns on 
the other . . . .”193 According to Justice Breyer, this interest-balancing 
approach strikes a balance between rational-basis review and strict-
188. In its historical support for an individual-right reading of the Second Amendment, Justice 
Scalia stated, “By the time of the founding, the right to have arms had become fundamental to 
English subjects.” Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2798 (emphasis added). The Court also points out that 
Blackstone “cited the arms provision of the Bill of Rights as one of the fundamental rights of 
Englishmen.” Id. (citing 1 BLACKSTONE 136, 139–40 (1765) (emphasis added)). 
189. However, Adam Winkler argues that “courts do not and have never applied strict scrutiny 
consisten.tly to all” fundamental or enumerated rights found in the Constitution. Winkler, supra note 
4, at 694. 
190. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817. 
191. Id. at 2854–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
192. Id. at 2852 (Justice Breyer did not agree with the majority’s endorsement of the 
individual-right reading of the Second Amendment, but according to Justice Breyer, this interest-
balancing approach should be applied to gun-control regulations under the majority’s individual-
right reading as well). 
193. Id.
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scrutiny review.194 Justice Breyer justified this interest-balancing 
approach accordingly: “The fact that important interests lie on both sides 
of the constitutional equation suggests that review of gun-control 
regulation is not a context in which a court should effectively presume 
either constitutionality (as in rational-basis review) or unconstitutionality 
(as in strict scrutiny).”195
Justice Breyer further explained that “where a law significantly 
implicates competing constitutionally protected interests in complex 
ways,” courts should ask “whether the statute burdens a protected 
interest in a way or to an extent that is out of proportion to the statute’s 
salutary effects upon other important governmental interests.”196 In other 
words, courts must determine at what point a statute that is enacted to 
protect the public becomes unconstitutional because it impinges too 
significantly on a protected, enumerated right. This interest-balancing 
approach would allow judges to examine the statute’s effects upon the 
competing interests and also allow judges to determine if “any clearly 
superior less restrictive alternative” exists.197 When courts apply this 
interest-balancing standard, some degree of deference is given to a 
legislature’s judgment in matters where a legislature has greater expertise 
and institutional fact-finding.198 However, “a court, not a legislature, 
must make the ultimate constitutional conclusion, exercising its 
‘independent judicial judgment’ in light of the whole record to determine 
whether a law exceeds constitutional boundaries.”199
In criticizing this interest-balancing or “proportionality” approach, 
the majority of Heller states, “We know of no other enumerated 
constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a 
freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”200 The majority saw Justice 
Breyer’s “judge-empowering” standard as inappropriate because “The 
very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of the government—
even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-
by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.”201 How 
can this be true? How would courts apply any standard to existing or 
future gun-control laws if they were not allowed to weigh the 
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., 
concurring)). 
 197. Id.
198. See id. (citing Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195–96 (1997)). 
199. Id. (quoting Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 249 (2006)).  
200. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821 (Scalia, J., majority). 
201. Id. The majority also states, “A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ 
assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.” Id.
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government’s interest in public safety against an individual’s right to 
keep and bear arms? In accepting certain limitations on the right to bear 
arms,202 isn’t the Court weighing interests and determining that the right 
to bear arms “is [not] really worth insisting upon” in those limited 
circumstances? The majority did not give this interest-balancing standard 
as careful and honest an evaluation as it should have. Justice Breyer 
responded to the majority’s criticisms of the interest-balancing standard 
in stating, “Contrary to the majority’s unsupported suggestion that this 
sort of ‘proportionality’ approach is unprecedented, the Court has applied 
it in various constitutional contexts, including election law, speech cases, 
and due process cases.”203
This interest-balancing standard is the correct standard for reviewing 
gun-control regulations and should have been adopted by Justice Scalia 
and the majority in Heller. As explained by Justice Breyer,204 this 
approach strikes an important balance between the deference granting 
rational-basis standard and the far less deferential strict-scrutiny 
standard. In every challenge to gun-control regulations, two important 
interests will strongly compete against each other: the government’s 
interest in protecting the public from the improper or accidental uses of 
guns versus the individual American’s interest in preserving her right to 
keep and bear arms. Given these two competing and incredibly important 
interests, it would be improper for a court to begin its analysis with a 
presumption of either constitutionality or unconstitutionality. 
Justice Breyer states that this interest-balancing approach is the 
“preferable” standard “for a further reason.”205 Justice Breyer further 
states, “Experience as much as logic has led the Court to decide that in 
one area of constitutional law or another, the interests are likely to prove 
stronger on one side of a typical constitutional case than on the other.”206
Since the Court has little experience in evaluating the Second 
Amendment under the individual-right interpretation of the Second 
Amendment, the interest-balancing standard would give courts the 
opportunity to weigh the interests without the built-in bias for or against 
the regulation that exists from the beginning of the evaluation in either 
the rational-basis or strict-scrutiny contexts.207 Therefore, the Court in 
202. See supra text accompanying note 185. 
203. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Thompson v. W. State Med. 
Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 388 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting)); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 
(1992); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 339–49 (1976); Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High 
Sch., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)). 
204. See supra text accompanying note 195. 
205. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2852 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
206. Id. at 2852–53. 
207. Id. at 2853. 
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Heller should have adopted Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing standard 
to give courts the direction and leeway to properly evaluate existing and 
future gun-control regulations. 
D.  How Should Courts Evaluate Gun-Control Regulations post-Heller? 
In rejecting not only the interest-balancing approach of Justice 
Breyer, but also the rational-basis and (implicitly) the strict-scrutiny 
approaches, the majority in Heller has seemingly painted the Court into a 
standard-less corner. Justice Scalia and the majority merely stated that 
the District of Columbia gun-control regulations were unconstitutional 
“[u]nder any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to 
enumerated constitutional rights.”208 What standard should courts use to 
evaluate future constitutional questions regarding gun-control 
regulations? The answer is unfortunately far from clear. The Court in the 
Heller opinion has explicitly prohibited courts from using both the 
rational-basis standard and Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing 
standard.209 The Court, in regarding certain existing gun-control 
regulations as “presumptively lawful,” implicitly prohibited courts from 
using the strict-scrutiny standard to review gun-control regulations.210
Given the Court’s reasoning, what standard is left?
The intermediate-scrutiny approach is the only standard not rejected 
by the Court, making this standard possible in an “addition by 
subtraction” process. To withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statute or 
classification must be “substantially related to an important government 
objective.”211 In comparison to this intermediate standard, rational-basis 
review requires a statute to bear a “rational relationship to a legitimate 
government interest,”212 and strict scrutiny requires a statute to be 
“narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest.”213 This 
intermediate standard would be very similar to Justice Breyer’s “interest-
balancing” approach because a court evaluating a statute under this 
intermediate approach would not begin with as strong a presumption for 
or against the statute as would exist with rational basis or strict 
scrutiny.214 Since the Court rejected the interest-balancing standard 
208. Id. at 2817 (Scalia, J., majority); see also id. at 2851 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
209. Id. at 2817, 2821 (Scalia, J., majority). 
 210. See supra text accompanying note 186. 
211. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (stating that this intermediate approach 
“generally has been applied to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy”).
212. See supra text accompanying notes 160–64. 
213. See supra text accompanying notes 173–79. 
214. Adam Winkler states that an intermediate scrutiny standard “would likely lead to only 
marginally different results than either strict scrutiny or even the reasonable regulation [or rational-
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suggested by Justice Breyer, the Court may also be unsatisfied with this 
similar, intermediate approach. Also, given that the District of Columbia 
could have very likely shown that the gun-control regulations at issue in 
Heller were substantially related to the “important governmental 
interest” of public safety,215 it is difficult to see how the Court could have 
declared the D.C. gun-control regulations as unconstitutional under the 
intermediate-scrutiny standard. Therefore, given the strong similarity of 
the intermediate standard to Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing standard, 
the Supreme Court would also likely reject this intermediate standard in 
reviewing gun-control regulations. 
Given the explicit or implicit rejection of potentially every standard 
of constitutional review by Justice Scalia and the majority in Heller,
courts are left guessing about how to review existing and future gun-
control regulations under an individual-right reading of the Second 
Amendment. The Court made waves by expressly adopting the 
individual-right interpretation of the Second Amendment, seemingly 
ending a long and drawn-out constitutional debate. However, the Court 
likely created not only a new debate, but a cloud of mystery, in failing to 
adopt a standard for future review of gun-control regulations. 
V.  CONCLUSION
Competing interests are common to the law, and the competition 
between the government’s interest in public safety versus its interest in 
the protection of enumerated rights is often seen in constitutional law. In 
District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms, putting 
to rest a long debate concerning the proper interpretation of the Second 
Amendment. However, in refusing to adopt a specific standard for courts 
to review existing and future gun-control regulations, and in possibly 
rejecting all standards commonly used to review statutes for 
constitutionality, the Court has likely planted the seeds for another long 
debate surrounding the Second Amendment. The Court should have 
adopted Justice Breyer’s interest-balancing standard of review for future 
gun-control regulations. Unfortunately, the only thing made clear by the 
majority opinion in Heller regarding the future review of gun-control 
regulations is that the situation remains extremely unclear. 
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